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Abstract By describing the practice of banning orders in the Netherlands, we inves-
tigate how the involved parties are dealing with their new responsibilities. We describe
the way the changes in security management exert further influence in the spatial
environment of city centers, and we analyze what this means in terms of equality of
rights for all citizens. With this analysis, an attempt to explain the exercise of power
beyond the State in policing space in Western countries is provided.
BTo police and to urbanize is the same thing^—Michel Foucault [1]
Introduction
Improving justice, upholding the law and protecting society are the cornerstones of a
democratic society and help people lead a safe and secure life. The last three decades
have witnessed radical changes in the way in which this occurs. Traditionally, the
government was viewed as the prime actor responsible for our security. But now, an
increasing number of other players have assumed tasks and responsibilities relating to
our safety and security. In some cases, they have taken over these duties completely.
Private guards monitoring shopping malls, university campuses and airports are a well-
known example [2–5].1 But schools, sports clubs and housing organizations are also
made responsible for the concern for safety and security in their policy [6, 7]. As a
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1For example, in 1981, the Netherlands had more than 10,000 private security agents, in comparison to almost
27,000 police officers. This number has now tripled in twenty years’ time and is approaching the current
number of public police functionaries [74].
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consequence, the government is merely ‘one of the players’, and no longer has a
monopoly on resolving challenges to security [8–10]. This does not mean that the
influence of the state has diminished, but it does mean that security issues can no longer
be approached from the standpoint of the government’s exclusive right. To paraphrase
Michel Foucault: BThe king is dead, long live the extended royal family^ [11].
The ‘responsibilization’ [12, 13] of parties other than the police emanates from the
insight that the traditional judicial slant is too restricted to allow an effective approach
to the current security issue. Tasks in this domain are increasingly being transferred to
other parties. An example is the Collective Pub Ban, a measure taken in the
Netherlands in an effort to make pubs, bars and nightclubs co-responsible for main-
taining safety and security within the city-center nightlife [14]. Depending on the
severity of the conduct, an offender can be denied of entry to these venues for a period
of 5 years. During this period, the offender is not allowed to enter the particular pub or
any of the other pubs, bars and nightclubs that participate in this measure. In addition,
similar sanctions are now being introduced in other Dutch cities, through denials of
access to public transport and shopping facilities.
Despite the sizeable body of knowledge of explanations for strategies such as
responsibilization to explain the exercise of power beyond the State, little research
has been performed in studies of governance about (1) how the new parties are actually
dealing with their new responsibilities, (2) the way the changes in security management
exert further influence in the spatial environment and (3) what this means in terms of
equality of rights for all citizens. In the knowledge that great progress can be made in
this field, the remainder of this article unfolds in three parts. First, I will describe the
new distribution of responsibility with regard to the organization of security manage-
ment in the Netherlands.2 Second, I will make a contribution to ethnographic research
into the regulation of public space by examining two public-private security assem-
blages, the Collective Pub Ban and the Collective Shop Ban. Finally, I will give a
response to normative issues concerning the extent to which the changes in security
management lead to a specific use of urban space and in which way this is accompanied
by the denial of access to large parts of cities to certain groups. In this way, this article
contributes to the growing literature on ‘policing space’ in Western countries (e.g., [7,
15, 16]).
Regulation of public space in the Netherlands
Where objective security is concerned, a strong increase in registered crime, in both
quality and degree of seriousness, has been visible in the Netherlands since the 1960s.
In 1980, the police registered 24 violent crimes per 10,000 inhabitants. This had risen to
2 In this matter, it is important to mention that not all Western countries demonstrate the same development
with regard to sharing responsibility in the field of safety and security. For instance, there is still a clear
distinction between governmental and private parties in various Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA. In
the Netherlands, since the last third of the twentieth century, there has been a visible tendency for the
government to collaborate increasingly with private parties in tackling crime and disorder. Recently, similar
developments have been present in other European nations but have yet not produced the same scale and
impact as in the Netherlands [33, 75]. Accordingly, it was interesting to take the Dutch situation as a starting
point for this research.
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87 per 10,000 inhabitants by 2004. Over the same period, crime against property rose
from 459 to 625 incidents per 10,000 inhabitants. And the number of instances of
vandalism and destruction registered by the police also rose substantially: from 65 in
1980 to 132 in 2004, per 10,000 inhabitants [17, 18]. As a consequence, the transfer-
ence of state’s power and responsibility for solving social problems to parties other than
the police, particularly ones that operate at a neighborhood level, has been on the Dutch
policy agenda since the 1980s. Currently, despite an irrefutable decrease in crime,
political notions as ‘participation society’ accompany this shift, containing normative
ideals of a small government and a more active role for citizens, social organizations
and business companies to combat crime and disorder. Hence, there is a strong focus on
‘crafting citizenship’ [19] and ‘crafting communities’ [20] in which parties such as
schools, soccer clubs, housing corporations, shopkeepers’ associations, and citizens, for
whom the tackling of security is often merely a secondary function, are brought
together to organize security in different sites.
To create more coherence in local safety politics, an attempt is being made to realize
an, what is called, ‘integral approach’ of community safety in which the concern for
security is a responsibility of ‘local security networks’ [7, 21, 22]. The underlying idea
is that an integral approach will lead to the disappearance of the barriers between
organizations, and to a better approach to the problem, the so-called
‘decompartmentalization’ ([23]: 810). In this integral approach, which refers to com-
pleteness, taking into consideration all underlying causes of insecurity and livability,
participating parties will be inspired and motivated to collaborate more, which should
lead to a more effective approach to security and livability. Sanctions from the Penal
Code may be applied but measures based on Administrative Law and Civil Law may
also be taken, such as the removal of opportunities and situations that facilitate crime
and disorder [24].3 In addition, there are the practical advantages of the cooperation
between the government and other parties itself. These mainly involve what are called
‘the learning processes of cooperation’ [25, 26]. This involves the transfer of knowl-
edge between the participating parties as a result of which the cooperation can be
reinforced and the aims achieved more quickly and effectively.4
The integral approach, and more specifically the combination of preventive and
repressive measures (‘prepression’), is most evident in the strong orientation toward the
design of, and access to, public space. Since 9/11, the governance of the Dutch city
center Bclearly echoes a mere exclusive discourse^ ([27]; see also: [28–30]). Much
public space is designed in such a way that unexpected occurrences can be largely
neutralized. Moreover, a whole body of regulators is often on call to ensure that social
friction is precluded. In that respect, public space increasingly resembles a closed space
with a strict admission policy. The move towards ‘security-obsessed urbanism’ [31] is
expressed, on the one hand, in making parties other than the government responsible
for the security problem in public space. These parties also apply various forms of
3 These advantages are also central in the ‘multi-agency approach’. This approach is used to combat
degeneration and petty crime in underprivileged districts [76, 77].
4 There is also a ripple of criticism, such as the vagueness of the concept of ‘integral‘and of the validity of the
argument that a coherent approach is essential in all those areas [78, 79]. For example, the authorities may hold
differing opinions about the precise nature of the problem and about the solution-orientations that are
applicable there. Moreover, strong horizontalization may bring the risk of too much or too little governance
and coercion, both of which lead to a reduction of the content [80, 81].
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control. On the other hand, a broad package of new measures and instruments, such as
CCTV cameras, radars and other control and detection devices, preventive frisking,
loitering prohibitions, and the application of stricter rules against dubious entrepreneurs
and firms in order to enhance the quality of the urban environment ([32]; see also: [15]).
Among the most taken for granted forms of the integral approach of public space in
the Netherlands are banning orders by which offenders are denied access or may only
enter public space under supervision. The denial of access to an area is possible on the
basis of the covenant that has been locally agreed between the municipality and the
participating parties. In addition to the ban, any punishable offense is reported to the
police. This occurs with a first infringement and with any subsequent violation of the
code of behavior, which is a punishable offense according to Article 138 of the Dutch
Penal Code. An important driving force for this development includes ideas that have
arrived from the United Kingdom and are known under the name of the ‘Anti Social
Behavior Order’ [33–35]. In this framework, passed as a part of the Crime and Disorder
Act 1998, measures are implemented to combat troublesome behavior such as vandal-
ism, rubbish on the streets, public drunkenness, noise disorder, and neighbor abuse. The
related measures involve a ban on entering certain areas or associating with certain
people. Although a number of critical comments have been made on the effects of Anti-
Social Behavior Orders (e.g., [36, 37]), policy makers and politicians still assume that
these ideas are effective and could also be applied in the Netherlands.
Methodology
Over the past 6 years, my colleagues and I have researched and written about the
empirical practice of community safety in the Netherlands (e.g., [14, 38–41]). Whereas
tackling these forms of insecurity is mainly seen as one of the duties of the Dutch state,
the clear demarcation of governmental tasks and tasks of other parties is coming under
increasing pressure. The complexity of security is linked to the number of organizations
that are attempting to resolve issues of community safety, and to the nature of the
measures employed to tackle the problems. This being the case, there is mention of ‘a
hybrid security model’ [7], with a rich and varied picture of responsibility and
representation.
The actual situation has consequences not only for more abstract concepts such as
citizenship and the spatial infrastructure of the city, but also impinges upon the concrete
execution of security tasks. In order to acquire a clear picture of what has changed with
respect to such issues, I present the results into the activities of private parties and the
effects of these on the collaboration with other organizations in two Dutch local
security assemblages involved in combating crime and disorder: the Collective Pub
Ban (CPB) and the Collective Shop Ban (CSB) [14, 42]. Both measures, CPB and
CSB, arose as a reaction to increasing concern in Dutch business circles about the
security of public space and the damage incurred as a result of criminal activity, such as
theft, harassment, violence, drunkenness and vandalism. According to the local entre-
preneurs, the classical reactions—detection and punishment – of the police and the
public prosecutor provided an inadequate response to the problems of crime and
disorder. For this reason, entrepreneurs developed their own security measures, such
as the imposition of a shop or pub ban on troublemakers, which is enforced throughout
M. Schuilenburg
the entire city center. The new element of the CPB and CSB is the fact that the ban
applies not only to the enterprise where it is imposed, but also to all the enterprises that
participate in the measure. In this structure, private parties such as shopkeepers, bar
staff and commercial security staff (bouncers and door staff) are jointly responsible for
tracing and punishing classical offenses, such as theft, abuse, threats and vandalism.
The CPB and the CSB are examples of, what Crawford [43] coined ‘contractual
governance’, whereby local agreements function as instruments of social control of
public space. Apparently, this contractual governance accommodates nothing more
than a farther-reaching regulation of the social order. In reality, a new set of instruments
besides criminal law is being created to keep a grip on the public and moral order of
society. The CSB and CPB are civil measures—property and contract form the basis of
these measures – and are separate from the criminal law system. This means that the
entrepreneurs are primarily responsible for the imposition of a CSB or CPB. A
shopkeeper or a hired private security guard decides whether or not someone should
be refused entrance. A legislative ground, in the sense of ‘a reasonable assumption of
guilt’, according to Article 127 of the Dutch Penal Code, is not required to enforce the
denial. Although criminal law remains present in the background in these banning
orders—as a result of the legal authorization of the shopkeeper to arrest someone who
is caught red-handed – the established penal process is largely skipped when parties
such as bouncers or door staff impose a CSB of CPB (see also: [44, 45]).
For an answer to the question concerning the particular qualities of regulating public
space as conceived by the authorities responsible for its regulation, we performed a
multiple-case study in four Dutch cities that apply the CPB and CSB: Utrecht (CPB),
Amersfoort (CPB), Den Bosch (CPB) and The Hague (CSB). In order to set up a useful
research project, we assumed that the local security assemblages to be studied are not
passive entities but are Beveryday processes of sense-making, symbolic communication,
and contested understanding^ [46]. Despite formal restrictions such as laws and
covenants, there is always scope not to apply the agreed measures (cf. [47]). These
issues are relevant because the current study of security is primarily oriented to whether
or not a chosen approach actually works, rather than to Bwhy and under which
circumstances^ ([48]: 70) that may be the case. One is mainly interested in the visible
and concrete results of security policy. In that respect, the study of policy outcomes of
security measures is well served, particularly with regard to the reduction of crime and
the attainment of public trust. However, much investigation into security does a very
poor job when describing the thoughts and actions of the authorities that (help) execute
security policy, although it is very probable that the interactions and significances that
these authorities ascribe to their own and one another’s actions can have consequences
for the results of a local security assemblage.
The empirical study was carried out by means of interviews, observations at the
locations, document research, and study of the literature. Respondents were sampled
through a combination of positional analysis (identifying responsible authorities in the
city-centers) and snowballing (in which these respondents referred to other key respon-
dents). In total, 171 interviews were held with entrepreneurs, bar staff and commercial
security staff (bouncers and door staff), police functionaries and municipal civil
servants. The interviews varied in length from half an hour to 2 hours. The number
of discussions varied from 84 interviews related to the CPB to 87 interviews with
parties that are involved in the CSB. Respondents were asked about their perceptions
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on the official policy of banning orders. Do they nurture opinions other than those
agreed upon? Do these opinions have consequences for the execution of their respon-
sibilities? In this way, it was possible to obtain insight into the everyday practice that
the parties undertake in the regulation of public space and the approach to security and
livability in city-centers in the Netherlands.
Behave or be banned?
With regard to the practical application and enforcement of the banning orders in the
four cities, the research showed important similarities between the four cases that
justifies their combined discussion. These similarities concern the willingness of the
involved parties to engage actively in the official policy of the banning orders and the
way the parties give substance to the agreements made. At least four arguments were
put forward, each of which, as I will argue, lead to an uneven treatment of the
troublemakers and great uncertainty about the way an offender’s case will be treated.
The first argument related to the fact that about half of the entrepreneurs are largely
unacquainted with the existence of banning orders. Although serious crime problems
were the immediate reason for introducing the CPB and CSB, this group claimed that
Bthey never use the measure^ or they told us^not knowing exactly why they join^.
While a great many shops in The Hague have indeed placed a red sticker on their doors,
bearing the text: BAdmission will be refused to shoplifters and others causing disorder^,
the salespeople hardly know what the sticker stands for. The interviews also indicate
that some shops refused to put the participation sticker on their door or window because
Bit can detract from the image of a chain of stores^, as a police member of staff
articulated it.
A second argument is that the various entrepreneurs are largely unacquainted with
the way the official forms ought to be used. Although the integral approach in the four
cities is replete with administrative forcefulness of expression, such as ‘decisiveness’,
‘persistence’ and ‘clarity’, reality turns out to be somewhat different. The entrepreneurs
often do not know where they can request the forms, and consequently do not have
them readily available. Those that do have the forms at hand are often unsure about
how to fill them out. The police remarked that a great many forms are submitted
incorrectly. This means that the bans cannot come into force immediately and they first
have to be rectified before they become valid.
The third argument deals with the fact that imposition of the banning orders is faced
with all kinds of individual exceptions. According to the respondents interviewed in
Utrecht, Amersfoort and Den Bosch, if problems occur with customers, they prefer not
to inform or call the police directly. Reasons are fear of a 'whiny image’ or, even worse,
for an image of a venue where disorderly behavior and violence often take place.
Moreover, the respondents in these cities told us that regular customers would have to
misbehave more serious than ‘passers’ [one-time customers, MS] to get an official ban.
In the interviews mention was made of ‘nepotism’, turning a blind eye to the disorder
caused by regular customers or by acquaintances. An owner of a pub used the word
‘class justice’ to emphasize the difference between regular and one-time customers.
Much the same happened in the context of the CSB. Shopkeepers mentioned that they
would not like to do without their regular customers. Many customers who have
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incurred a CSB in another shop are therefore not denied access to some other shops.
BAs long as these people behave properly in these shops, they will be allowed entry,^ as
one entrepreneur was keen to stress.
Respondents also prefer informal ways to resolve a conflict with troublemakers.
Respondents in both security assemblages claimed that they prefer a verbal denial to
the imposition of an official sanction by taking a troublemaker to the back office to
fill out the necessary forms. In the case of the CPB, different respondents declared
they scarcely need the police in solving incidents: BI'm a talker, that's why I play in
on their mind. I'm always willing to put someone out, but that's really the very last
means.^ Furthermore, various respondents mentioned the lack of time to impose a
CSB or CPB. No extra time is made available for such activities. Here, too, the
entrepreneur’s financial considerations form an important motivation for the
choices made. For instance, many shops have insufficient staff at their disposal to
effectively uphold the CSB. Such cases mostly involve one-man businesses and
small shops. The comments made by the manager of a clothing shop in The Hague
were illustrative of this: BYou do not isolate a thief to ask him politely if he would be
good enough to fill out this form.^ In many cases, small shops simply eject the
offenders without reporting any violations.
Finally, a fourth argument is sometimes brought forward stating that various entre-
preneurs are reluctant to impose a banning order on the offenders because they are
afraid that the police will give their calls over time less attention. Respondents told us
that if they call the police too often Btheir reports at some point will no longer being
taken seriously .^ One respondent we spoke to was clear about the possible conse-
quences of this type of conduct: BIt can also work against you if you’re going to call the
police for every trifle.^ At the same time, the respondents warned of the effect that
Btheir business can get a bad name to the police and municipality .^ According to the
respondents interviewed, entrepreneurs prefer not to have their place known by the
local authority as a place where there is a high chance of violence. This was illustrated
by the following quote: BThe last thing you want is that the municipality visits you
often.^
In summary, the emerging mode of regulation associated with banning orders points
to intensified social and spatial control of Dutch city centers via formal mechanisms,
such as increased surveillance and door security staff. At the same time, the four
arguments make clear that one business will be much stricter in the imposition of a
CSB or CPB than another. Although both procedures specify a uniform working
method to settle cases of disorder and shoplifting, real-life practice indicates that
entrepreneurs have difficulty in adhering to this setup. They make all kinds of excep-
tions to the written agreements and, partly as a consequence of this, the enforcement of
order in real-life practice has acquired a more arbitrary character. Although these
deviations from the rule frequently have a strongly individual motivation, they are
generally based on the same practical considerations, for instance the lack of time to
impose a banning order or a double loyalty to certain customers. As a consequence, for
an offender, there is great uncertainty about the way his or her case will be treated. This
poses questions as to the wisdom of the state in uncritically setting a responsibilization
process in motion. It makes relevant the question of whether or not dealing with
offenses like theft, fraud, intimidation, and vandalism can be left so easily to private
actors such as shopkeepers and bar staff. But it also raises questions about the way the
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banning orders actually lead to a specific use of urban space. It is to this very point that
I now return.
Selective exclusion
It can be stated that one of the consequences of the banning orders is that new spatial
orderings are produced in city centers. The CSB and CPB, but also public transport and
football banning orders, demand their own place in the city, and have the capacity to
draw and control new boundaries in this context. These banning orders mark the
transition to rules and prescriptions other than those that prevail in the rest of the city.
They manage people in place by enforcing the correct behavior of residents and visitors.
People entering these zones are expected to adapt their behavior to the regulations that
apply within these areas. As such, the implementation of new sanctions in combination
with one’s own, formulated rules—regardless of the fact that these are often driven by
the best intentions (‘doing good’) – can give rise to unforeseen social divisions.
A relevant aspect here is that these boundaries present a different reality to different
groups in society. In the shadow of the law, these banning orders are devices for, what
Hacking [49] called, ‘making up’ subjects, by which new social categories are con-
structed out of new forms of security measures. This is shown by the CPB through
which offenders can be denied access to large parts of the city center for a period of
5 years. In this way, certain people are excluded from the inner city and the corre-
sponding local facilities. This spatial revolution is perhaps one of the most striking
aspects of the responsibilization process. As I mentioned earlier, in that process, an
increasing number of areas are being approached with security in mind, and security
techniques are being applied on an ever-expanding scale in public space. In conjunc-
tion, these changes seem to tell the story of a society gravitating toward the safest point.
But they are also accompanied by Ban increasing loss of democratic control^ [50] and
the Brestriction of access and free encounters between citizens^ (cf. [51, 52]). With this,
the question arises as to how security can facilitate inequality and play a role in moral
issues concerning who is granted or denied access to certain parts of the city.
The situation that an increasing number of people are being denied access to certain
places and the corresponding facilities by banning orders occurs in several countries,
such as Germany [53], Australia [54], the United Kingdom [33] and the United States.
For instance, Beckett and Herbert [55, 56] investigated the way in which undesired
people were refused access to various areas in Seattle and the way they reacted to this
refusal. The aim of the banishment is to improve the quality of the location in question.
Another aim that should justify the ban, it is claimed, is that people who are excluded
Bare encouraged to desist from any deviant behaviors in which they may engage^
([55]: 105). The authors concluded that it is mainly poor people who are banished, with
the black population as the greatest victim of the new security policy. They provide also
various arguments why they give preference to the term ‘banishment’ rather than
‘exclusion’. With banishment Beckett and Herbert wish to emphasize the coercive
power of the government to refuse people access to certain places by means of an
official decree. Moreover, they wish to draw attention to the punitive character of the
measure. The problems of the people in question, often beggars, the homeless, drug
addicts or immigrants without papers, which Wacquant [57] defined as ‘discardable
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categories’, are generally seen as criminal issues. In addition, the term closely connects
to the experience of the people who are banished. In the Dutch case, Boone and Van
Swaaningen [27] have used the same term to point at Bthe temporary or permanent
denial of access to offenders or potential offenders to certain places or functions^.
Although no term is perfect, it seems in advance that ‘banishment’ is too general and
has too little relevance to the hybrid security landscape in which this technique is
exercised. I have demonstrated that the inclusion and exclusion of people always depends
on a specific security assemblage, each of which has its own rules and punishments.
Accordingly, I prefer the term ‘selective exclusion’ due to its more specific meaning.5
Selective exclusion reaches further than the term ‘banishment’, which is associated with a
juridical-political form of power—delineated by a Bjuridical sovereignty and the institu-
tion of the state^ ([58]: 34; [59]: 102) – and which Foucault called ‘classic power’ or ‘the
power of law’. In this latter usage, the emphasis lies on themonopoly of the government to
implement rules and sanctions by means of the tools of public legislation, with the state
depicted as a ‘modern Leviathan’ [60] focusing on combating^all imaginable sources of
harm^ ([61]: 35). In addition, banishment is more related to the removal of people from a
community. People are literally ‘expelled from the common case’ – sent away from a
village, city or country – such as in the case of the banished lepers in early modern Europe
([62, 63]: 198; [64]: 145–146; [58]: 43–44). In contrast, ‘selective exclusion’ is a much
more dynamic concept in the study of policing space because it refers to the fact that there
are all kinds of social divisions in the city that entail their own public and particular rules of
behavior—creating fragmented security at micro-level.
In the case of banning orders, offenders are no longer welcome in distinct parts of
cities in which separate social regulations apply and which are under supervision of
varying assemblages of police, private security guards and related professionals. From
the various examples of the way in which this occurs, it appears that the primary effect of
this kind of schism is that certain people are excluded from the facilities in the areas in
which they live, and end up in a subordinate and dependent relation to other groups in
society. They are temporarily (referring to short periods of time) and, in other cases,
permanently excluded from participation in the life that goes on in other parts of the city.
In that case, they experience ‘civil death’, to use an expression of Goffman ([65]: 16), as
they lose many of the freedoms that they had taken for granted. These are developments
we are seldom aware of, although they exert a determining influence on everyday life.
Concluding thoughts
In the above discussion I hope to have shown that since the 1980s, the Netherlands has
witnessed an ongoing development in which an attempt is beingmade to find an answer to
crime and disorder through cooperation between private and public parties at local level.
The new distribution of responsibility in the Netherlands is most lucidly characterized by
security assemblages in which local parties, with the aid of the local government, design
5 I have been influenced by the extensive work of Simon on actuarial techniques of insurance, which construct
groups along dimensions that erode the basis of collective identity and action. For example, insurers use
selection processes to establish Bthat each person should be assessed precisely in terms of the burden of risk
that he creates^ ([82]: 784).
Behave or be banned? Banning orders and selective exclusion
their own security program and prescribe certain behavior for people in public space, such
as the CSB and the CPB. Regardless of how justified and convincing the banning orders
may be in the view of the parties involved, security management does benefit from more
clarity about the nature and reach of the measures taken. After all, the instrumental
function of security seems to be of greater consequence than the protective function. I
have demonstrated that, within certain margins, the official starting points of the covenants
are disrupted. In this context I have pointed to the generation of behavioral patterns that
seem self-evident to some participants, although they entail the necessary arbitrariness in
the implementation and enforcement of the CSB and CPB. For instance, where one
shopkeeper may impose the strictest possible version of a banning order, others may be
prepared to ignore much of the disorder. These self-organizing processes do not come to
expression as a single entity in any of the assemblages studied, but nonetheless they can
still cast a shadow on the aim of treating all offenders equally.
Besides being a matter of the protection of citizens against non-legitimate use of
coercion and violence, and values like equality of rights and justice, security is also a
matter of ordering. Ordering concerns the allocation of places. This spatial process is
articulated here and there and is occasionally studied, but it has not yet received the
attention it deserves in studies on the governance of security. The literature on security
refers to the spatial concentration of crime (in certain neighborhoods for example) and
the role of the environment in the genesis of crime, which gave rise to popular
criminological theories, such as ‘routine activity’ theory [66] and ‘broken windows’
theory [67, 68]. However, in contrast to many other social sciences, the physical and
social setting is not wholly integrated into many studies on security. The spatial context
(here regarded as ‘the city-center’) appears as a ‘side-show’, stated Hayward ([69]: 87),
as something that must be added to the research in retrospect. Besides the physical
architecture of locations such as airports and gated communities, I have pointed to a
more complex phenomenon. Banning orders, such as the CSB and CPB, demand their
own place in the city, and have the capacity to draw and control new boundaries in this
context. A relevant aspect here is that these boundaries present a different reality to
different groups in society. This is shown by the fact that offenders are excluded from
specific areas in the inner city and the corresponding local facilities. I refer to this
spatial process as ‘selective exclusion’.
The spatial changes in security management have normative consequences that can
scarcely be overestimated. They lead to a different view on the theme of the city and the
citizen, and also put pressure on classical legal principles and social ideals. In terms of
upholding justice, this leads to numerous new questions and problems. For instance,
there is the question concerning the classic idea of a city as a unit, as a freely accessible
public sphere. Of particular relevance is here how people can assert ‘a right to the city’,
meaning a claim to places rich in qualities and utilitarian value, where there is time for
encounter and social intercourse without commercial motives or a profit-and-loss
mentality being involved ([70]; see also: [71, 72]). Other questions relate to the
problem if we can still think of security as a ‘thick public good’, understood as an
indispensable constituent of any good society [73]. These are questions that generally
attract less attention in the literature on security, although they are certainly not less
important. I realize that it is easier to pose such questions than to answer them, but
answers will have to be found. At this moment, it is striking how little interest Western
governments are displaying in the issue of what the new parties are doing with the
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responsibility in security. Not only do the parties scarcely accept public accountability
at all, but the governments are also doing nothing to prevent abuse of responsibilities.
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